Central bank independence (CBI) and its link to inflation have become a part of conventional wisdom. However, the literature shows that there is a lack of a stable general pattern for the relation between CBI and inflation, even for relatively homogenous groups of countries. In this study, we use two indexes for CBI proposed in the literature. For the panel of 51 countries (24 advanced and 27 nonadvanced economies), we estimate two regression models-one with inflation as a dependent variable and another with inflation gap in this role. We use two estimation methods: the panel fixed effects model with serial autocorrelation in the error term and the Arellano-Bond difference generalized method of moments estimator. In addition, we use disaggregated indices to check what aspects of independence are of highest importance. Our results suggest that CBI has a negative significant impact on inflation mostly by results for nonadvanced economies and that this relationship did not change during the recent crisis.
| INTRODUCTION
Central bank independence (CBI) and its link to inflation have become a part of conventional wisdom in economics. It is most often explained by the time inconsistency of optimal policy and inflationary bias of the government when the latter is responsible for both the real economic activity and nominal stabilization. Seminal papers by Kydland and Prescott (1977) , Barro and Gordon (1983) , and Rogoff (1985) have shown simple and consistent theoretical framework justifying-with the time inconsistency of optimal monetary policy-delegation of responsibility for a price stability to an independent central bank. Goodhart (2003) and Gnan and Masciandaro (2016) present the same story in a more narrative manner to make it understandable for the general public.
Validity of the link between CBI and inflation can be empirically tested only when CBI is quantified. The most popular approach to measuring CBI is to create an index based on expert assessment of various dimensions of CBI: legal, personal, economic, financial etc. The index designed by Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) and another index constructed by Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) are most widely used in the literature. The former includes 15 components that are divided into two groups measuring respectively economic and political independence, the latter includes 16 components and they form four groups measuring the governor's political independence, monetary policy process (its design and resolution of potential conflicts), objectives of the central bank, and limits for central bank's lending to the government.
The first wave of empirical work directed into finding a meaningful relation between CBI-as measured with those indexes-and inflation did not bring fully satisfactory results. Both teams that introduced CBI indexes, that is, Grilli et al. and Cukierman et al. , ran regressions on inflation using their indexes, and they found them negatively correlated with inflation, though not for all countries in their samples and not for the overall periods they studied. Later papers showed qualitatively similar results, and further developments went in two different directions. The first one was the search for the conditions that might make CBI statistically significant in the inflation regression. That mostly took the form of introducing more covariates into this regression motivated mainly by ad hoc arguments, for example, growth dynamics, labour market variables, level of development, and political and social variables. The latter choice was to some extent supported by the second direction of further developments, that is, by the political-economy approach to the problem of CBI where its impact on inflation was conditional on institutional features of the economy.
All these extensions of empirical strategies were not successful in bringing fully unambiguous results for the shape and strength (or even for the sheer existence) of the relation between CBI and inflation. As our literature review presented below shows it is still difficult to obtain a negative and statistically significant effect on inflation of CBI across all groups of countries and time periods. This lack of a stable general pattern for this relation, even for relatively homogenous groups of countries, has become our initial motivation for the study we present below.
Another strand of the debate on CBI and inflation that influences our study is due to major central banks engaging themselves into so-called unconventional monetary policy during the great financial crisis. As some of those activities seem to go beyond the specific mandate that justifies theoretically CBI itself, natural outcome questions arise about the limits of that independence: should it cover only the narrowly defined monetary policy or should it also include other central bank activities going beyond that, including macroprudential policy (cf. Blinder, Ehrmann, de Haan, & Jensen, 2017; de Haan & Eijffinger, 2016 Issing, 2016; Mersch, 2017) . Most discussants give a clear answer that the concept of CBI applies only to the central bank as a monetary policy institution. However, those extensions of central bank functions that are mentioned earlier have been accompanied by changes in central bank laws and regulations (cf. Khan, 2017) . Thus, it is a valid question to check whether different measures of CBI have showed some changes for the crisis and after-crisis period and whether the link between CBI and inflation has changed its nature after the crisis. For example, for the turnover rate, Artha and de Haan (2015) find that financial crises increase the probability of a central bank's governor turnover.
Hence, our contributions to the existing literature may be summarized as follows. First, we use two measures of legal CBI for the same sample of countries and the same period. Our results suggest, in opposition to many earlier studies, that the legal CBI is important in lowering inflation in nonadvanced economies, whereas it is insignificant in advanced ones. Moreover, although both indices produce almost the same results in terms of sign and statistical significance of the relationship, there are some significant differences in the estimated strength of the relationship, which suggests that focusing on only one measure of CBI may give uncertain results.
Second, in addition to the analysis of the link between CBI and inflation rate, we investigate the link between CBI and inflation gap. As the inflation gap, we understand the deviation of inflation from inflation target (details are described below). The reason for such treatment of the dependent variable is that our sample period includes episodes of very low or even negative inflation rates in some of the countries. This could bias our results on the basis of inflation rate, as the assumption that the central banks may aim at such low inflation rates seems implausible. This is a novel approach to analysis of the macroeconomic effects of CBI and, to our knowledge, firstly used in the literature. Most recently, Nurbayev (2017) goes beyond investigating the relationship between CBI and the level of inflation, and he studies the relationship between inflation volatility and CBI (and the rule of law). However, with inflation at the very low levels, inflation volatility is also likely to be very low. Our approach assumes thus that central banks aim at inflation rates at target levels (low but positive).
Third, as we have at our disposal disaggregated data on the CBI indices (subindices constituting the CWN and GMT measures), we check what aspects of CBI have effect on inflation and inflation gap in advanced and nonadvanced economies. Similar analysis is performed by Balls, Howat, and Stansbury (2016) , although they distinguish only between political and operational independence. Similar idea is also used by Crowe and Meade (2008) , and they find that having a single well-defined inflation or price level target is the only aspect of CBI that in a statistically significant way influences inflation. Our analysis suggests that most of the legal aspects of CBI are important in the nonadvanced economies, whereas virtually none are in the advanced economies.
Finally, we include an interaction between CBI and a crisis dummy to investigate whether the global financial crisis changed the link between CBI and inflation (or inflation gap). Our results show in general no significant change in the relationship.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the related literature in more detail. The third and fourth sections present, respectively, data used in the study and its methodology and results concerning the relation between CBI and inflation and inflation gap. The last section offers some conclusions.
| LITERATURE REVIEW
The basic and most widely accepted theoretical explanation of the benefits of CBI goes back to the inflationary bias of government as described by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) . Government is tempted to create unexpected inflation to modify the ex post real value of nominal contracts (including wages), which in turn stimulate employment and output. Of course, rational agents are aware of this temptation so they adjust their inflation expectations to the equilibrium point where there is no unexpected inflation but inflation is higher than the optimal level. CBI as a tool for reducing this inflationary bias may mean-as in Rogoff's (1985) interpretation-a central bank with a different preferences for stable prices than society or-as in most practical applications-a central bank with a strict priority for the price stability and no direct responsibility for employment, output, and so on.
This theoretical explanation and solutions for the inflation-bias problem have been extensively and critically discussed (cf. Piga, 2000, and references therein), but this rationale for CBI is still present in the literature. It follows directly that we should observe a direct relationship between inflation and CBI, and that is what the first wave of empirical literature concentrated on. Many studies have found a regular inverse relationship between CBI and inflation (Grilli et al., 1991; Cukierman et al., 1992; Alesina and Summers, 1993; Masciandaro and Spinelli, 1994) . Nevertheless, other studies show clearly the heterogeneity of the relation between CBI and inflation across countries and specifications with different control variables. Cargill (1995) shows this lack of robustness for developed countries (Cukierman, Miller, & Neyapti, 2002 )-for a group of transition economies (more examples of individual studies of this kind are presented in surveys by Klomp & de Haan, 2010; Posso & Tawadros, 2013; Iwasaki & Uegaki, 2017) .
Further developments in this area bring two important insights. First, there are some dissenting theoretical views what is a true rationale for CBI. Posen (1995) and Miller (1998) initiate-according to our best knowledge -explanations of CBI within the political-economy approach, that is, by explicit introduction of interest groups that support or oppose inflation and political institutions expressing and implementing those interests (cf. Papadamou, Sidiropoulos, & Spyromitros, 2014; Hielscher & Markwardt, 2012) . Second, empirical researchers accepted the need for larger sets of panel data allowing for studies of the effects of changes in CBI and its components over longer periods of time and their possible impact on the CBI-inflation link (e.g., Arnone & Romelli, 2013; Dincer & Eichengreen, 2014) .
Both developments suggest quite convincingly that any empirical research should use a dynamic panel approach with model specification allowing explicitly for possible differences between countries with stronger and weaker institutions supporting rule of law to a different extent and for the important role of other economic and political variables (cf., e.g., Polillo & Guillen, 2005; Bodea & Higashijima, 2017; Papadamou, Spyromitros, & Tsintzos, 2017) . This reading of the more recent literature is supported by several surveys and meta-analyses, for example, by Klomp and de Haan (2010) , Bodea and Hicks (2015) , Balls et al. (2016) , and Iwasaki and Uegaki (2017) .
These insights from the recent literature heavily influenced our research strategy, which we present in the later sections.
| DATA
In the empirical part of our study, we use two indices for CBI: the Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (CWN) index, from the database provided by Garriga (2016) , and the Grilli, Masciadaro, and Tabellini (GMT) index, calculated for a longer sample by Masciandaro and Romelli (2015) . The common sample of these two independence measures covers the period from 1992 to 2012 for 52 countries. After excluding one country for missing data other than CBI index, our panel includes 51 countries, of which we classify 24 as advanced economies and 27 as nonadvanced (emerging and developing) economies. 1 We use two indices of legal CBI for robustness purposes. Although many studies indicate high correlation between these two CBI measures, in our study, this correlation equals 0.67, which suggests some differences between them. Moreover, after the outburst of the global financial crisis, some changes were introduced in the legal framework of central banks (cf. Khan, 2017) . Our two indices capture those changes to a different extent.
Hence, for the period 2008-2012, the correlation between the indices decreases and equals 0.59. Even more significant differences may be observed for the respective subindices.
2
Figures 1 and 2 (see Appendix A) show, respectively, the mean values of GMT and CWN indices for the whole sample of countries and for the group of advanced and nonadvanced economies over the entire period. The data suggest that the legal CBI started declining slightly after the beginning of the global financial crisis. However, the timing of the decline was different in both groups of countries. In the advanced countries, CBI was increasing continuously until 2007 (according to GMT) or 2008 (according to CWN) and decreased afterwards. In the nonadvanced economies, the decline occurred later (after 2011), although it is difficult to state definitely if the trend continued. Nevertheless, it seems that the crisis stopped the trend towards greater CBI around the world.
The remaining data used in our study mostly come from the World Bank Development Indicators database and the IMF database. The dependent variable is inflation, measured as the annual percentage change of the CPI index. Explanatory variables include GDP per capita growth rate (annual, %), general government budget balance (% of GDP), 34 and openness of the economy, with the latter variable measured as the sum of imports and exports in relation to GDP. We include a fiscal variable in our model to capture for the possible effects of the "unpleasant monetarist arithmetic" by Sargent and Wallace (1981) and the effects predicted by the fiscal theory of the price level (e.g., Woodford, 1994 Woodford, , 2001 Leeper, 1991; Sims, 1994) that state that loose fiscal policy may lead to higher inflation. The effect of trade openness on inflation is not clearly established in the literature. Although the seminal papers of Romer (1993) and Lane (1997) postulate negative relationship, the empirical evidence that followed is more ambiguous (for a review of literature, see Badinger, 2009 ). In addition, we use a measure of democracy Polity 2 from the Polity IV database to capture the quality of institutions (as explained in Section 2) and a dummy for the exchange rate regime (where 1 denotes fixed exchange rate and 0 floating exchange rate). The dummy is based on the Reinhart coarse classification of exchange rate regimes (available at www.carmenreinhart.com). The descriptive statistics of the variables calculated for advanced and nonadvanced countries (presented in Table A1 ) suggest some differences between these groups of economies. The advanced economies were in general characterized by lower inflation and GDP growth rates, although the differences were definitely larger in the case of inflation rates. Significant differences can also be noticed in the level of democracy, which is higher for the advanced countries. The nonadvanced economies were characterized by higher variation of all but one variable, that is, openness. We perform four different panel unit root tests to check stationarity of the variables used in the analysis. The results of the tests are summarized in Table A2 . All the tests indicate stationarity of GMT index, CWN index, inflation, inflation gap, the rate of growth of GDP, the government balance, and openness, 5 whereas two tests confirm stationarity of the Polity 2 measure.
6 FIGURE 1 Grilli, Masciadaro, and Tabellini (GMT) index.
Source: own preparation
| METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
We analyse the impact of CBI on inflation by estimating the following panel data model:
where the dependent variable, π, is transformed according to the formula inflation rate/(inflation rate+1), which is commonly used in empirical studies of CBI to mitigate the problem of hyperinflation episodes. CBI denotes the legal CBI measured as the GMT index and the CWN index. In addition to the set of control variables described in the previous section, the equation includes interaction between a crisis dummy (equal to 1 for the years 2008-2012 and 0 otherwise) and the CBI measure to capture the possible impact of the crisis on the relationship between CBI and inflation. δ i denotes the countries' fixed effects, and ε i,t is an error term. As our data include negative observations of inflation, which may distort our results concerning the link between CBI and inflation, we also estimate another equation, where the dependent variable is inflation gap -the difference between inflation and inflation target. 7 We assume that the independent central bank tries to minimize the inflation gap, so the relationship should be negative. In order to eliminate the negative observations, we assume that targets are treated symmetrically, and we use the absolute value of the inflation gaps. The set of explanatory variables is the same as in Equation (1).
For calculations, we use two estimation methods. Both deal with the endogeneity problem arising from the use of lagged dependent variable as an independent variable and address the potential bias in the estimated coefficients. First, the panel fixed effects model with serial correlation in the error term, modelled as AR (1) process, is used.
8 Second, to check the robustness of our results, we use the difference GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) . The dynamic models are estimated in first differences with lagged variables used as instruments. The results are presented in Tables 1 and 2 , where columns (1), (3), (5), (7), (9), and (11)-denoted as (I)-present results for the models with the AR(1) term and columns (2), (4), (6), (8), (10), and (12)-denoted as (II)-results obtained with Arellano-Bond estimator. Our results suggest that CBI has negative significant impact on inflation, regardless of the CBI measure used. We obtained similar findings in the case of inflation gap. However, if we divide the panel into two subsamples 
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses. Variables statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted with "***", "**" and "*", respectively.
-denotes that the variable was excluded from the dynamic model due to the lack of variability. Source: own calculations. 
Standard errors in parentheses. Variables statistically significant as the 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted with "***", "**" and "*", respectively.
-denotes that the variable was excluded from the dynamic model due to the lack of variability. Source: own calculations.
(advanced and nonadvanced economies), the relationship seems to hold only for the second group of countries. All specifications and estimation methods indicate importance of CBI in lowering inflation in emerging and developing countries. In the advanced economies, CBI seems to play no significant role in (dis)inflation process. Both dependent variables-inflation and inflation gap-do not response to the change in the CBI.
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Our findings suggest moreover that the relationship between inflation and CBI did not change during the crisis. The estimates for the interaction between CBI and crisis dummy are not statistically significant. The only exception is the model for inflation gap for the advanced economies estimated with FE and AR(1) term. In this case, crisis strengthened the positive impact of CBI on inflation gap. Taking into account, however, that the crisis period in our time-series covers only four last years, this may be too short a period to assess the impact of the crisis in a reliable manner. Hence, this issue may require further research.
Analysing the remaining control variables, the GDP growth seems to increase inflation and inflation gap in the advanced economies. On the other hand, we obtained the opposite relationship in the case of the nonadvanced economies (but only according to the Arellano-Bond estimator). This finding underlines additionally the difference in the inflation process between advanced and less developed countries.
Trade openness does not seem to be an important determinant of inflation gap in any type of economies. As far as inflation is concerned, the results are mixed. Whereas in the advanced economies trade openness does not play an important role in inflation determination, the nonadvanced open economies may benefit from lower inflation rates. This possibility is suggested by one estimation method. The results concerning the budget balance are even less unequivocal. On the whole sample of countries, the budgetary surplus seems to increase inflation, which is difficult to explain on the theoretical basis. However, it lowers inflation in the advanced economies. In the nonadvanced economies, it is statistically insignificant. As far as the inflation gap is concerned, using the whole sample of countries, we come to the conclusion that budgetary surplus (or decrease in the budgetary deficit) leads to the decrease in the inflation gap. Similar conclusions are obtained using the sample of nonadvanced economies. However, in the advanced economies, the budgetary balance does not seem to have an impact on the inflation gap, which stays in contradiction to the results obtained for inflation rate. Those troubling results reflect-in our opinion-recent outcomes of studies on fiscal multipliers, where the size and sign of fiscal impact on output depends on the income level of the economy in question, the current stage of the business cycle, and so on (cf. the recent review of this literature in Arizala, Gonzalez-Garcia, Tsangarides, & Yenice, 2017) .
Fixed exchange rate seems to be consistent with lower inflation rate and inflation gap. However, when we take into account the distinction between the advanced and the nonadvanced economies, it seems that the fixed exchange rate lowers inflation and the inflation gap only in the nonadvanced economies, whereas in the advanced ones, the exchange rate regime is statistically not significant. This result is not surprising in the light of theory of the choice of the exchange rate regime, because fixed exchange rate enables lowering inflation in economies where credibility of the central bank is low.
Finally, democracy helps to lower inflation and inflation gap. This result is statistically significant for the whole sample of countries. Again, there is clear difference between the subsamples, with significant impact of democracy only in the less developed economies, which may suggest that the democracy variable is to a large degree a variable that distinguishes advanced economies from the nonadvanced ones. The results provide, therefore, strong evidence for the differences in the determinants of inflation between different types of economies. The institutional arrangements such as BCI, level of democracy, or the exchange rate regime seem to play much more significant role in the group of nonadvanced countries.
The conclusion regarding different effect of CBI depending on the state of the economy is in line with the empirical findings of several other studies (some of them cited above) and suggests that independence should be assessed separately for different types of countries. Furthermore, this may suggest that different aspects of independence may be important for these different types of countries. We address the former issue by dividing our sample into two groups of countries and by presenting separately results for advanced and nonadvanced economies. The latter issue is addressed by estimating the same models as presented in Tables 1 and 2 , but with individual subindices of CBI index describing different aspects of independence as explanatory variable instead of the general GMT and CWN indices.
The GMT index consists of political and economic indices. Political independence refers to the capacity of monetary policymakers to choose the final goals and is described by three components: the procedure for appointing the central bank's board members, the relationship between the central bank's governing body, and the government and the formal responsibilities of the central bank. Economic independence refers to the ability of the central bank to choose the instruments of monetary policy and consists of two aspects: limitations on 
Note.
Standard errors in parentheses.
-denotes that the dynamic model was not estimated due to the lack of variability of the dependent variable.
Source: own calculations.
*Statistically significant at 10%. **Statistically significant at 5%. ***Statistically significant at 1%.
lending to the government and the types of instruments under the control of the central bank (Grilli et al., 1991) . Similarly to the original paper of Grilli et al. (1991) and later works such as Masciandaro and Romelli (2015) or Balls et al. (2016) , we use these two subindices of CBI (denoted in Table 3 as GMT econ and GMT pol). However, to ensure comparability with the CWN index, we use in addition more detailed components of the GMT index referring to appointment procedures (GMT board), limitations on lending to the government (GMT lending), price stability as a goal of monetary policy (GMT obj), and relationship with the government (GMT policy). The CWN index consists of four parts: the term of office, appointing and dismissing conditions of the chief executive officer (denoted CWN board), limitations on lending to the government (CWN lending), and objectives of the central bank-what is the status of price stability objective in the central bank's mandate (CWN obj) and policy formulation conditions-the extent to which central bank has the authority to formulate monetary policy and the power to resist the government (CWN policy).
The difference in the effects of different aspects of independence between advanced and nonadvanced economies is clearly visible (Table 3. ). Although virtually none of the subindices is significant for inflation in advanced countries, most of them has significant impact on inflation in the nonadvanced ones. Similar conclusions may be drawn in the case of inflation gap. For advanced economies, only in the case of economic independence and lending to the government captured by the GMT index, whereas using the Arellano-Bond estimator, we found negative statistically significant relationship with inflation. In this respect, our conclusions differ from those obtained by Balls et al. (2016) , who found that operational (economic) independence had significant negative impact on inflation in advanced economies in the 1970s and 1980s (but no effect later), whereas in the emerging and developing economies, neither political nor operational independence were significant for inflation developments. It is interesting to note that the most important aspects of independence for lowering inflation and minimizing the inflation gap in the emerging and developing countries are economic/policy independence and restrictions on lending to the government. This is consistent with the basic economic intuition behind the CBI relation to inflation, that is, the negative outcomes of debt monetization and the importance of autonomy of the central bank in setting the policy instrument.
The results are very similar for both estimation methods.
10 Both methods correct for the bias caused by the endogeneity problem, which may suggest that in many earlier studies using only OLS or FE estimators, the lack of relationship between inflation and independence might be due to the estimation bias and not due to the real nonexistence of link between these two variables. Our findings strongly support the view that the legal CBI, in almost all its aspects, is an important factor for inflation process in the emerging and developing economies. The rest of the findings is very similar to those presented in Tables 1 and 2 and underlines the differences between distinguished types of the economies regarding the inflation developments. The rate of growth of GDP seems to be positively correlated with inflation and inflation gap in the advanced economies whereas negatively in the nonadvanced ones. Trade openness is not relevant for inflation in the advanced economies, but for the less developed countries, the results are mixed, rather suggesting the negative relationship. Fiscal prudency seems to lower inflation in both types of economies; the effect is stronger, however, in the advanced ones. Finally, exchange rate regime and democracy are significant determinants of inflation (or inflation gap) only in the group of nonadvanced countries. According to expectations, fixed exchange rate regime and higher level of democracy are associated with lower inflation rates. All the results are presented in Table A4 .
Our conclusions can be viewed as an argument in the renewed debate about the importance of the institution of CBI. After significant trend towards higher independence and encouraging results of studies evaluating the impact of CBI on inflation performance in advanced economies, the environment of low and stable inflation rates in the later period (or even "too low for too long" inflation rates in some economies) raised questions about necessity of this institution. Even more controversies emerged after engagement of many major central banks in quasi-fiscal activities. The results of our study confirm the importance of legal CBI for emerging and developing economies. They also may suggest, however, that it can be still desirable in advanced economies once inflation rates start to rise or become more volatile.
| CONCLUSIONS
Our study contributes to the renewed discussion about the importance of CBI after the global financial crisis. Our analysis confirms findings of previous empirical studies showing that the effect of CBI on inflation may be different for different groups of countries. To ensure the robustness of the results, we use two measures of legal CBI (the CWN and GMT indices), two measures of price stability (inflation rate and inflation gap), and two estimation methods (FE estimator and Arellano-Bond estimator). In addition, we use disaggregated indices to check what aspects of independence are of the highest importance.
Our results suggest that CBI has a negative significant impact on inflation and inflation gap in the group of nonadvanced economies, whereas no significant effect in the advanced ones. Moreover, we claim that most of the aspects of independence are important for the inflation process in the nonadvanced countries. Although much attention is given in the recent literature to the changes in the role of CBI after the beginning of the recent crisis, we do not find evidence for changes in the impact of CBI on inflation or inflation gap after the crisis. These results should, however, be verified in further studies covering longer period, as our analysis covers only several years after the outburst of the global financial crisis.
Our findings provide clear policy implications. It seems that in advanced economies with high overall quality of institutions, CBI adds little to the control of inflation. The opposite is true in the case of less advanced countries. In the face of weaker other institutions an independent central bank strongly supports disinflation process in these countries.
the study drop a cross-section from the test, if the value of the variable for this cross-section does not change during the entire sample period. In the case of the Polity 2 measure there were many such cross-sections, therefore we conclude that the variable is stationary. 7 If a country is an inflation targeter, we use explicit inflation targets; for countries with no explicit inflation targets and fixed exchange rates, we use inflation target of the reference country; and in the very limited number of cases where there is no specific reference country or the exchange rate regime cannot be classified as fixed, we use 2% as a target which is the most common value in our sample. 8 The use of fixed effects was suggested by the redundant fixed effects tests and the Hausman test for fixed vs. random effects. The results of the tests are presented in Table A3 . 9 In addition, the robustness of the results has been checked by excluding one country each time from the sample. We found that the estimates are very robust to the sample selection. The results of this exercise are not presented in the paper due to limited space but are available upon request. 10 We are very grateful to the reviewer for suggesting the use of the panel model with FE and AR(1) term. (1) and (2) (not presented in Table 3 ) 
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-denotes that the variable was excluded from the dynamic model due to the lack of variability Source: own calculations.
